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GOD AND THE MORAL ORDER: 
REPLIES TO OBJECTIONS 
C. Stephen Layman 
Peter Byrne has offered three important objections to the main argument in 
my "God and the Moral Order." In this essay I provide replies. The central 
claims of "God and the Moral Order" may be boiled down to: the Reasons 
Thesis ("The strongest reasons always favor doing what is morally required") 
and the Conditional Thesis ("If there is no God and no life after death, then 
the Reasons Thesis is false"). Byrne's objections are: (1) Non-theists can read-
ily accept the Conditional Thesis because the cases used to support it are rare 
and rather extreme. (2) The cases used to support the Conditional Thesis in 
fact fail. (3) My argument falsely presupposes that agents can weigh pruden-
tial and moral reasons from some neutral standpoint. 
Peter Byrne has offered three important objections to the main argument 
in my "God and the Moral Order."! In this essay I provide brief replies. 
The central claims of "God and the Moral Order" may be boiled down 
to these: 
The Reasons Thesis: The strongest reasons always favor doing what is 
morally required. 
The Conditional Thesis: If there is no God and no life after death, then 
the Reasons Thesis is false. 
The case of Ms. Poore is used to support the Conditional Thesis. Ms. Poore 
faces a choice between stealing a large sum of money and living in unceas-
ing poverty. It is built into the case that stealing will not greatly harm the 
victim (who is well off) and that Ms. Poore has excellent reasons to sup-
pose she won't get caught. 
Objection 1: Non-theists can readily accept the Conditional Thesis because the 
cases used to support it are rare and rather extreme. They are cases in which the 
agent is (a) unlikely to be caught and (b) does relatively little harm. Such excep-
tions to the Reasons Thesis would not undermine morality.2 
First, I agree that the non-theist has the resources to argue that, in 
most cases, the strongest reasons favor doing one's duty. But, second, if 
it should turn out that a significant range of moral duties are not backed 
by the strongest reasons, I don't think that's something to take lightly. If 
Ms. Poore has overriding reason to steal, then many people arguably do at 
some point in their lives; roughly speaking, they do if they are poor, they 
can steal from someone who won't be greatly harmed thereby, and they 
probably won't get caught. More generally, the question is raised whether 
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one has overriding reason to do some wrong act if one has much to gain, 
one probably won't get caught, and the resulting harm is not great. Sure-
ly that's something to be concerned about. One needn't claim that "the 
sky will fall in" in order to offer a significant moral argument for theism. 
Third, if some moral duties are backed by the strongest reasons and some 
are not, it seems to me that the situation inevitably invites a revision of 
morality, with those acts not backed by the strongest reasons apt to be re-
classified as not morally required. This again seems to me not something a 
morally serious person should take lightly. Nor can it be taken lightly by 
those non-theists (many of them philosophers) who claim that their meta-
physical position supports morality as well as theism does. 
Objection 2: The cases used to support the Conditional Thesis in fact fail. For 
example, if Ms. Poore steals, she is acting in a morally permissible manner, even 
though she violates a customary moral rule. Her case is similar to cases used in 
studies of moral development, e.g., Mr. X needs medicines to save a gravely ill 
dependent, has no money to buy the medicines, and so can obtain them only by 
stealing from a local pharmacy.3 
First, I agree that there are exceptions to "Stealing is wrong." My argu-
ment is not meant to depend on moral rigorism, which I regard as unten-
able. But second, I tried to describe the Ms. Poore case so that she had 
strong reasons to steal but not a sufficient moral justification. Of course, as 
with any detailed moral case, there is apt to be some disagreement about 
the impact of adding or deleting certain factors. One way to handle this 
complication is to make a distinction between the basic outlines of the case 
and various ways it might be elaborated. The basic outlines are as follows: 
Ms. Poore faces a choice between a life of unceasing poverty and stealing 
a large sum of money. The level of poverty is highly restrictive but not ex-
treme, e.g., she is not starving or homeless. In all likelihood, she can steal 
the money without getting caught. Stealing the money will not result in 
great harm, e.g., it will not reduce the victim to poverty. 
Given these basic outlines, does Ms. Poore have overriding reason to 
steal assuming that there is no God and no life after death? I am inclined to 
think so. For those not so inclined, the case may be elaborated in various 
ways. (A) Build into the case that the stolen money will open up educa-
tional opportunities for Ms. Poore and hence allow her to move from very 
uninteresting employment to very interesting employment. One's quality 
of life is greatly affected by the level of interest one has in one's work. So, 
this addition is highly significant. It does not make stealing morally per-
missible, but, in my view, it plausibly gives Ms. Poore overriding reason to 
steal- if there is no God and no life after death. (B) If one is not convinced 
that elaboration (A) gives Ms. Poore enough reason to steal, build into the 
case additional problems Ms. Poore faces, all of which can be solved if 
she steals the money, e.g., outstanding debts, substandard housing, inad-
equate heat in the winter, lack of funds for vacations or amusements, non-
painful dental problems, and/or a medical condition that is not extremely 
serious, such as persisting but non-intense back pains. Now, it seems to 
me that none of these factors (and not even all of them taken together) 
makes stealing morally permissible, but they do give Ms. Poore additional 
reasons to steal, in my view, overriding reason to steal assuming that there 
is no God and no life after death. 
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For the sake of clarity, let me add that certain ways of elaborating the 
case would make stealing morally permissible. For example, we could 
build it into the case that Ms. Poore has children with severely debilitating 
diseases that will go untreated unless she steals the money. This way of 
elaborating the case is of course not useful for advancing my argument-
except insofar as it helps to clarify the type of case that does advance it. 
Many traditional ethicists would allow for exceptions to "Don't steal" in 
these rather extreme cases, but not in the less extreme cases my argument 
depends on. 
Objection 3: Your moral argument assumes that agents can weigh pruden-
tial and moral reasons from a neutral standpoint. But there is no such neutral 
standpoint. Moreover, morality demands our allegiance. If Ms. Poore views her 
situation from the moral standpoint, she will see that she" can only avoid poverty 
by becoming a thief-a status which she can never lose . ... " She will also see that 
"she could not expect other human beings, judging impartially and rationally, to 
endorse" her theft. And "these points suggest a deeper necessity than mere analy-
ticity to the claim that morality is overriding."4 
First, the objection certainly does not show that the Reasons Thesis is 
a necessary truth. Just consider the following: There is no obvious logical 
impossibility in supposing that there is a malevolent Deity who eternally 
damns the virtuous and who sends the wicked to eternal paradise. In such 
a literally demoralizing situation, surely the strongest reasons would not 
favor doing one's duty. Objection 3 in no way eliminates this apparent 
possibility. 
Second, we can hardly claim to approach any important philosophical 
question in an unbiased way, so if "neutral" means "unbiased," there is no 
neutral standpoint for discussing "Why should I be moral?" Nevertheless, 
the question is one we can intelligibly discuss, it seems to me. We can see 
that different kinds of reasons support human action -e.g., moral reasons, 
prudential reasons, reasons having to do with etiquette. When these rea-
sons back conflicting actions (e.g., "steal and refrain from stealing"), we 
can ask which reasons are stronger, weightier, or overriding. In that sense, 
it seems to me, there is a standpoint of rationality from which we can com-
pare the strengths of moral and prudential reasons.s 
Philosophy often involves comparing "apples and oranges," i.e., 
things that cannot be measured or evaluated via any formula. It doesn't 
follow that comparison and evaluation are impossible, only that they 
will inevitably be intuitive and imprecise. W. D. Ross's scheme of pri-
ma facie duties provides a helpful illustration. Suppose I've promised to 
meet a friend for lunch, but on the way I come across a seriously injured 
person who needs my help, and I can help only by failing to meet my 
friend for lunch. In such a case, the prima facie duty of fidelity (the duty 
to keep promises and agreements) conflicts with the prima facie duty of 
beneficence (the duty to help others). Ross provided no procedure for 
determining which prima facie duty is overriding and indeed he claimed 
that no such procedure is available. One can agree with Ross about this 
and yet sensibly claim that beneficence clearly outweighs or overrides 
fidelity in this particular case. We can see that beneficence is overriding 
in this case even though we lack a formula, scale, or procedure for making 
the determination. 
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In closing, I would like to make an observation about theistic arguments 
in general and the moral argument in particular. Most philosophers,. the-
ists included, agree that simple versions of the theistic arguments are 
open to devastating objections. The more interesting and defensible theis-
tic arguments are also more complicated. But of course the complications 
provide further possible avenues for criticism. During the past 50 years, 
many subtle and complicated versions of ontological, cosmological, and 
design arguments have been developed, but moral arguments have re-
ceived much less attention. (Compare the readings on moral arguments 
in widely used anthologies in the philosophy of religion with the read-
ings on the ontological, cosmological, and design arguments.) I think that 
"God and the Moral Order" provides a relatively complicated and subtle 
moral argument for theism. The complications admittedly provide vari-
ous possible avenues of criticism -a fact borne out by the objections dis-
cussed above. But as with other theistic arguments, the complications also 
give the argument important strengths.6 
Seattle Pacific University 
NOTES 
1. Peter Byrne, "God and the Moral Order: A Reply to Layman," forthcom-
ing in Faith and Philosophy. 
2. Ibid., 3-6. 
3. Ibid., 6-9. 
4. Ibid., 11-13. 
5. Compare: "Some philosophers have claimed that the word' ought' has at 
least two different senses-a moral sense, and a prudential ... sense. Even if 
this claim is true, it seems that there must be a further sense of 'ought' that is 
neither narrowly moral nor narrowly prudential. Consider a case where you 
know that you are morally required to do X and prudentially required to do Y, 
but it is impossible to do both. In this case, it seems quite intelligible for you to 
ask yourself, 'Ought I to do what I am morally required to do, X? Or ought I to 
do what I am prudentially required to do, Y? Neither of these questions seems 
equivalent to the trivial question, 'Ought I to do what I ought to do?' But if that 
is true, then the term' ought' cannot occur here in a narrowly moral sense, or a 
narrowly prudential sense. It must occur in a general normative sense." Ralph 
Wedgwood, "The Metaethicists' Mistake" forthcoming, Philosophical Perspec-
tives 18 (2004). Available at: http://users.ox.ac.uk/-mert1230/papers.htm, 2-3. 
6. I wish to thank Terence Cuneo and Phillip Goggans for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
